Introduction: why cyber security of ATS is a maintenance issue
Industrial control systems (ICS/ACU TP) at Ukrainian enterprises operate under conditions of constant cyber threats. According to CERT-UA, in 2023–2024, more than 2,500 incidents targeting critical infrastructure facilities were recorded. The IEC 62443 standard (a series of 14 documents, the last consolidated edition — 2024) defines a systematic approach to the protection of industrial networks at all levels — from components to organizational policies.
For a service engineer, cybersecurity is not an abstract IT task. Every open patch on the controller, every non-updated firmware of the HMI panel, every unprotected Ethernet port on the drive is an attack vector. IEC 62443-2-3:2015 (Patch management in the IACS environment) directly regulates the procedures for updating the software of ACS components as part of scheduled maintenance.
The Law "On Critical Infrastructure" (No. 1882-IX) entered into force in Ukraine on January 1, 2024, which obliges operators of critical infrastructure facilities to implement cyber protection systems in accordance with international standards. DSTU EN IEC 62443 is adopted as a national standard by the confirmation method.
Scope and obligation
Who should be responsible?
- Operators of critical infrastructure objects (categories A, B, C according to Resolution of the CMU No. 1109)
- Enterprises with ACS TP connected to corporate networks
- Production with SCADA, DCS, PLC-systems of levels 0-3 according to the Purdue model
- Suppliers of ATS components (requirements IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2)
What equipment is covered by the requirements
- Programmable logic controllers (PLC) — Siemens S7-1500, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix, ABB AC500
- Operator panels (HMI) — Siemens Comfort/Unified, Weintek, Schneider Magelis
- Frequency converters with network interfaces (Profinet, EtherNet/IP, Modbus TCP)
- Industrial switches and routers (Hirschmann, Moxa, Phoenix Contact)
- Sensors and transducers with HART/Foundation Fieldbus/IO-Link
- Industrial PCs, SCADA servers, historian systems
Industries
Energy, water supply, chemical industry, metallurgy, food industry, cement production, mining industry - any production with automated management of technological processes.
Key requirements of the standard
| Document | requirement | Implementation period | responsible |
|---|---|---|---|
| IEC 62443-2-1:2010+AMD1:2024 | Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) - Policies, Procedures, Roles | 12 months from the moment of object categorization | Head of the enterprise |
| IEC 62443-2-3:2015 | Patch management procedures for the IACS environment | 6 months after CSMS implementation | Engineer ACS TP / IT-security |
| IEC 62443-3-3:2013 | System Level Security Requirements (SL 1-4) | When designing / modernizing | Project engineer |
| IEC 62443-4-2:2019 | Technical requirements for components (SL-C) | When purchasing new components | Procurement Department / MRO |
| DSTU ISO/IEC 27001:2023 | Integration of ISMS with CSMS | Parallel to IEC 62443-2-1 | CISO / responsible for IS |
Impact on maintenance operations
Patching as part of scheduled maintenance
IEC 62443-2-3 requires a formalized software update process for industrial components. This means:
- Inventory of all software assets (PLC firmware, HMI OS, SCADA versions)
- Monitoring of security bulletins from manufacturers (Siemens ProductCERT, Rockwell Knowledgebase, ABB Cybersecurity Advisory)
- Risk assessment before applying the patch (CVSS score ≥ 7.0 — critical, closure period ≤ 30 days)
- Patch testing on backup hardware before deploying to production
- Documentation of each update in the change log
Changes in procurement of spare parts
The IEC 62443-4-2 standard establishes four component security levels (SL-C 1–4). When replacing the controller, switch or HMI panel, you must:
- Check for ISASecure certificate (EDSA/SSA/SDLA) or Declaration of Conformity IEC 62443-4-2
- Make sure that the firmware supports a secure update (signed firmware update)
- Request documentation on hardening guidelines from the supplier
- Maintain supply chain integrity — purchase only from authorized distributors
Documentation
Each maintenance procedure related to cyber-physical systems must contain:
- Asset ID and current firmware version
- List of applied patches with dates
- Integrity check results (hash sums, digital signatures)
- Signature of a responsible person with qualifications (GICSP certificate, ISA/IEC 62443 Cybersecurity Certificate)
Component requirements and certification
Components with mandatory cyber security certification
| Component type | Requirement IEC 62443-4-2 | Minimum SL-C | Examples of certified solutions |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLC / Safety PLC | FR 1–7 (identification, authorization, data integrity, auditing) | SL-C 2 (typical production), SL-C 3 (critical infrastructure) | Siemens S7-1500 (TÜV SÜD certified), Allen-Bradley GuardLogix 5580 |
| Industrial switches | FR 1, FR 2, FR 5 (restriction of data flows) | SL-C 2 | Hirschmann EAGLE40, Phoenix Contact FL MGUARD |
| HMI panels | FR 1, FR 3, FR 4 (confidentiality, integrity) | SL-C 2 | Siemens Unified Comfort Panels (V18+) |
| Frequency converters with Ethernet | FR 1, FR 7 (availability of resources) | SL-C 1 | ABB ACS880, Siemens G120 with CU250S-2 |
| Industrial routers / firewalls | FR 1–7 (full set) | SL-C 3 | Fortinet FortiGate Rugged, Cisco IE-3400 |
Mechanical and electrical components
Cyber security requirements do not cancel classic certifications. For components operating in an ACS TP environment, the following are still mandatory:
- CE marking (Directive 2014/35/EU for low-voltage equipment)
- UkrSEPRO certificate for equipment subject to mandatory certification in Ukraine
- Compliance with DSTU EN 60529 (degree of IP protection) for automation cabinets
- DSTU EN 61439-1:2017 for low-voltage complete devices
- Bearings, seals, connectors — compliance with ISO 9001 and specific standards (ISO 15:2017 for rolling bearings)
Compliance Checklist for the Service Manager
- A complete inventory of the software assets of the automatic control system (PLC, HMI, SCADA, network equipment) was carried out - firmware versions were documented
- A register of assets has been created with classification by security zones (zones) and communication channels (conduits) in accordance with IEC 62443-3-2
- A target security level (SL-T) is defined for each zone
- Appointed person responsible for patch management of ACS TP (not a general purpose IT department)
- Signed on the safety bulletin of all manufacturers of the installed equipment
- A risk assessment procedure has been developed before applying the patch (risk assessment template)
- A staging environment has been created to test patches before production
- The maximum terms for closing vulnerabilities are defined: CVSS ≥ 9.0 — 14 days, CVSS 7.0–8.9 — 30 days, CVSS 4.0–6.9 — 90 days
- Implemented a backup procedure for PLC/HMI configurations before each update
- Physical protection of programming ports (USB, serial ports) is provided - plugs, cabinet locks
- Checked for IEC 62443-4-2 certificates for all recently purchased components
- Implemented network segmentation (VLANs, firewalls) between zones of levels 0-3 and the corporate network
- Logging of security events with centralized collection (syslog/SIEM) is configured
- Maintenance personnel were trained in the basics of cyber hygiene (changing default passwords, banning USB drives)
- An incident response plan was developed with the definition of the roles of maintenance personnel
- Contracts with spare parts suppliers were checked for supply chain integrity requirements
- An audit of legacy systems was conducted — compensatory measures were determined for systems without patch support
- All remote connections to ACS TP (VPN, modems) are documented — minimized to the required minimum
- Change management is implemented - no update without an approved change request
- An annual compliance audit of IEC 62443 with the involvement of an external auditor is planned
Typical inconsistencies identified by auditors
1. Lack of patch management as a process
At 78% of Ukrainian enterprises (according to the estimate of DSSZZI, 2023), the PLC firmware update is not carried out at all or is carried out only during major repairs. Controllers run on firmware 5–10 years old with known vulnerabilities (CVE).
2. Default passwords
Siemens S7-300/400 without password protection, HMI panels with admin/admin login, switches with factory default credentials. Violation of FR 1 (Identification and Authentication Control) IEC 62443-4-2.
3. Lack of network segmentation
PLC and corporate network in the same VLAN. No DMZ between layers 3 and 4. Direct violation of IEC 62443-3-3, SR 5.1 (Network segmentation).
4. Inconsistency of purchased components
Replacing a failed switch with a household (non-managed) switch without ACL, VLAN, 802.1X support. Purchasing counterfeit or unauthorized components without documentation.
5. Lack of changelogs
Inability to track who, when and what changed in the PLC program. Lack of project versioning.
Liability and sanctions
Administrative responsibility
The Law of Ukraine "On Critical Infrastructure" (Article 27) provides:
- Fine for non-compliance with cyber protection requirements — from 3,400 to 51,000 UAH (100–1,500 NMDH) for officials
- Fine for legal entities — up to 2% of annual turnover (by analogy with NIS2 Directive 2022/2555 upon integration into the European market)
Criminal liability
Article 363-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (interference in the work of information systems) — if inaction led to an incident with serious consequences: up to 5 years of imprisonment.
Insurance consequences
Insurance companies refuse to pay out in case of proven non-compliance with cyber security standards. A typical loss from a cyber attack on an industrial enterprise is between EUR 500,000 and EUR 5,000,000 (data from the Allianz Global Industrial Report 2024).
Contract risks
European customers require confirmation of compliance with IEC 62443 as a condition of the contract. Non-compliance = loss of export contracts.
Practical recommendations for implementation
Step 1: Current status audit (1-2 months)
Inventory of all components of ACS TP. Determination of the current security level (SL-A — achieved). Identification of the gap between SL-A and target SL-T.
Step 2: Policy development (2-3 months)
Creation of a patch management procedure for IEC 62443-2-3. Integration with the existing scheduled maintenance system (CMMS). Definition of roles and responsibilities.
Step 3: Technical implementation (3–6 months)
Network segmentation. Replacement of equipment that does not support safety requirements. Monitoring settings. Implementation of secure remote access.
Step 4: Purchasing the appropriate components
In the case of planned replacement or modernization - the selection of components with confirmed compliance IEC 62443-4-2. Industrial switches, controllers, frequency converters, sensors with network interfaces - everything must have documentation describing the implemented security functions (Security Features).
Result
Cyber security of industrial control systems is not an optional IT initiative. This is a mandatory component of technical maintenance, established by the legislation of Ukraine and international standards. IEC 62443-2-3 directly defines patching as a maintenance procedure. Each replacement of an ACS TP component must take into account cyber security requirements along with electrical and mechanical characteristics.
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List of regulatory documents
- IEC 62443-2-1:2010+AMD1:2024 — Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 2-1: Establishing an IACS security program
- IEC 62443-2-3:2015 - Patch management in the IACS environment
- IEC 62443-3-2:2020 — Security risk assessment for system design
- IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - System security requirements and security levels
- IEC 62443-4-1:2018 — Secure product development lifecycle requirements
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Technical security requirements for IACS components
- Law of Ukraine "On Critical Infrastructure" No. 1882-IX dated November 16, 2021
- CMU Resolution No. 1109 of October 9, 2020 "On Approval of the Procedure for Forming a List of Critical Infrastructure Objects"
- DSTU ISO/IEC 27001:2023 (ISO/IEC 27001:2022, IDT)
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) — for enterprises with European contracts
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (2023) — Guide to OT Security (reference)